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In most economies, a fair allocation does not exist. Thus, it seems that we are condemned to live in an unfair 
world, since we are not happy with what we have and we look at the others with envious eyes. In this paper we 
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The problem of fairness has been widely investigated and applied in many contexts,
such as exchange economies [11], public good economies [2], as well as marriage
markets [9]. The most appealing concept of fairness is due to Foley (1967) and
Varian (1974), and it comes from only personal tastes. Indeed a fair allocation is an
e±cient distribution of resources among agents such that \each individual prefers to
keep his bundle rather than to receive the bundle of any other". Everybody wants to
live in a fair world in which he is happy with what he has and can coexist with the
others without any kind of envy. This is possible in a pure exchange economy simply
because any competitive allocation resulting from an equal sharing of the total initial
endowment is fair. Unfortunately, this is an ideal world. Indeed, when production
is allowed, envy freeness may be incompatible with e±ciency and therefore the set
of fair allocations may be empty (see [10] and [11]). The same problem arises in
condition of uncertainty or when agents are asymmetrically informed (see [4] and
[7]). Our goal is to provide a condition which guarantees the existence of a fair
distribution of resources among asymmetrically informed agents. We show that
if there is a state of nature ¹ ! that everybody can distinguish, then there is no
tension anymore between interim e±ciency and absence of envy. Hence, surprisingly,
the presence of a common singleton in the private information partition of each
individual is enough to ensure equity in the economy. But, this is not the end of the
story. Indeed, one could observe that fairness is just a property that an equilibrium
may or may not satisfy. Therefore, the mere existence of a fair allocation may be
negligible if no equilibrium satis¯es such a property. We exhibit an example of
di®erential information economy in which, even if the set of fair allocations is non
empty, the constrained market equilibrium, which is what really agents consume, is
not fair. This example reinforces the idea that in di®erential information economies
fairness is an utopia, and since everyone could agree that all economic activities or all
contracts among individuals are made under uncertainty or incomplete information,
it seems that we are condemned to live in an unfair society. In this paper we address
the following questions: are really asymmetrically informed agents envious? Is there
anything we can do to change such an unfair situation? In what do we make mistake?
We show that the solution consists in changing our attitude towards uncertainty. If
we abandon the Bayesian subjective expected utility (SEU) formulation and replace
it by the maximin expected utility (MEU), not only a fair distribution of resources
among asymmetrically informed agents always exists, but also the related notion
of competitive equilibrium is fair. In other words, we propose a new notion of
equilibrium which solves the con°ict between e±ciency and envy freeness when the
equity of allocations is evaluated in an interim stage. The idea is to expect to receive
the minimum in each possible situation.
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where I is the ¯nite set of agents; I R`
+ is the commodity space; ­ is the ¯nite set of
possible states of nature, F is the power set of ­, i.e., the set of all the possible events
and ¼ is the common prior describing the probability of each state1. Each individual
i 2 I is characterized by an initial endowment ei : ­ ! I R`
+, a partition Fi of ­
which represents his private information and an utility function ui : ­ £ I R`
+ ! I R
representing his preferences. We assume that for each i 2 I and ! 2 ­, ui(!;¢)
is continuous, strongly monotone and concave. For each state ! and each agent i,
we denote by Fi(!) the element of Fi containing !. As usual, we can interpret the
above economy as a two time period model (t = 1;2), today t = 1 agent i only knows
that the realized state belongs to the event Fi(!), where ! is the true state at t = 2.
With this information agents trade. At the ex post stage (t = 2), the state will be
commonly known and consumption takes place. This requirement makes irrelevant
incentive and measurability constraints.
An allocation2 x is a function x : I £ ­ ! I R`
+, and it is said to be feasible if P
i2I xi(!) =
P
i2I ei(!) for all ! 2 ­: For any allocation xi : ­ ! I R`
+, agent i's
(Bayesian) interim expected utility function with respect to Fi at xi in state












The maximin utility of each agent i with respect to the partition Fi in state






As the reader can see, (2) corresponds to an interim notion and does not require
any expected utility representation.
2.1 The \Bayesian" case
We now recall the de¯nitions of e±ciency and fairness in a di®erential information
economy, in which agents' preferences are represented by the Bayesian interim ex-
pected utility (1).
A feasible allocation y interim Pareto dominates an allocation x if every agent,
given his private information, prefers y over x in each state, i.e., vi(yijFi)(!) >
1Without loss of generality, we assume that ¼(!) > 0 for each state ! 2 ­.
2For each agent i, the function xi : ­ ! I R`
+ is said to be the allocation of agent i, while the
vector xi(!) 2 I R`
+ is said to be the bundle of i in state !.
2vi(xijFi)(!) for each i 2 I and each ! 2 ­: A feasible allocation x is said to be
interim e±cient if it is not interim Pareto dominated by any other allocation. Let
x be a feasible allocation and let ! be a state of nature. Then, an agent i interim
envies an agent j at ! if vi(xjjFi)(!) > vi(xijFi)(!): The allocation x is said to be
interim envy-free if there is zero probability of an agent interim envying another,
i.e., there does not exist a state ! at which some agent i interim envies some agent
j. A feasible allocation x is said to be interim fair if it is both interim e±cient and
interim envy-free.
It is easy to show that the allocation which equally shares the aggregate en-
dowment in each state is interim envy-free. Clearly, also the set of interim e±cient
allocation is non empty, but it is known that a fair allocation may not exist (see
Example 1 in [4]). Although, De Clippel (2008) shows that interim e±ciency is
compatible with a weaker3 notion of envy freeness: there exists an interim Pareto
optimal allocation such that it is impossible to ¯nd two agents i and j for which it
is common knowledge4 that i interim envies j (see Proposition 1 in [4]). This result
is obtained by using the notion of constrained market equilibrium introduced by
Wilson (1978) which we recall below.
A pair (p;x), where p : ­ ! I R`
+ is a non-zero function and x is a feasible alloca-
tion, is said to be a constrained market equilibrium if for each i 2 I and ! 2 ­,





A constrained market equilibrium exists and it is interim e±cient, but it may
not be interim envy free. For this reason, De Clippel evaluates envy freeness only in
common knowledge events. However, this is not enough, since it might be the case
that even if there is no envy in a commonly known event, agent i could envy j in
a di®erent event which is not \commonly known", and therefore there may still be
envy.
2.2 A su±cient condition
Our goal is to provide a condition which guarantees the existence of a fair distri-
bution of resources among asymmetrically informed agents. We show below that if
there is a state of nature ¹ ! that everybody can distinguish, i.e.,
(¤) f¹ !g 2 Fi for all i 2 I;
then there is no tension anymore between interim e±ciency and absence of envy in
each event and not only in the \common knowledge"ones. We prove it by using
3A di®erent approach is taken in [1] in a more general context.
4An event E is said to be common knowledge if it can be written as a union of elements of Fi
for each i 2 I; i.e., E 2
V
i2I Fi.
3the notion of competitive equilibrium5. Notice that in our context this notion is
just technical, since in di®erential information economies agents do not consume
competitive equilibrium allocations, but constrained market equilibrium allocations.
Theorem 2.1 Assume that condition (¤) holds, then there exists a fair allocation.
Proof: First, notice that any competitive equilibrium (p;x) resulting from an equal
sharing of the initial endowments
³
i:e:; ei(!) = 1
jIj
P
i2I ei(!) for each i 2 I and each ! 2 ­
´
,
is interim envy free. Indeed, assume on the contrary, that there exists a state ! and
two agent i and j such that vi(xjjFi)(!) > vi(xijFi)(!): From (1) it follows that
that there exists a state !0 2 Fi(!) such that ui(!0;xj(!0)) > ui(!0;xi(!0)), and
hence p(!0) ¢ xj(!0) > p(!0) ¢ ei(!0) = p(!0) ¢ ej(!0). This is a contradiction, since
p(!) ¢ xj(!) · p(!) ¢ ej(!) in each state ! 2 ­. Moreover, notice that any equal
income competitive equilibrium is interim e±cient. Assume, by the way of contra-
diction, that there exists a feasible allocation y such that vi(yijFi)(!) > vi(xijFi)(!)
for each i 2 I and each ! 2 ­. In particular, it holds in the state ¹ ! of condition (¤),
in which the above inequality reduces to be ui(¹ !;yi(¹ !)) > ui(¹ !;xi(¹ !)) for all i 2 I:
Therefore, p(¹ !) ¢ yi(¹ !) > p(¹ !) ¢ ei(¹ !) for all i 2 I; and hence p(¹ !) ¢
P
i2I yi(¹ !) >
p(¹ !) ¢
P
i2I ei(¹ !); which contradicts the feasibility of the allocation y. Thus, any
equal income competitive equilibrium allocation is fair, and from non emptiness of
the set of competitive equilibrium we can deduce the existence of a fair allocation.
¤
Therefore, surprisingly, the presence of a common singleton in the private in-
formation partition of each individual (see (¤)) is enough to ensure equity in the
economy. Although, this is not the end of the story. Indeed, one could observe that
fairness is just a property that an equilibrium may or may not satisfy. Therefore,
the mere existence of a fair allocation may be negligible if no equilibrium satis¯es
such a property. We now exhibit an example of di®erential information economy
in which, even if the set of fair allocations is non empty, the constrained market
equilibrium, which is what really agents consume, is not fair.
Example 2.2 Consider an economy with three agents, three equiprobable states of
nature f!1;!2;!3g and one good (money). The total endowment is equally shared
among agents and it is 1200 dollars when the state is !1; it is 1800 dollars when the
5A pair (p;x), where p : ­ ! I R`
+ is a non-zero function and x is a feasible allocation, is said
to be a competitive equilibrium if for each i 2 I and ! 2 ­, xi(!) maximizes ui(!;¢) subject
to p(!) ¢ xi(!) · p(!) ¢ ei(!): It is well known that under standard assumptions, a competitive
equilibrium exists.
4state is !2, and some positive quantity c > 0 if the state is !3. Agent 3 knows the
future state. Agents 1 and 2 do not. Agent 1 is risk neutral while agent 2 is risk
averse. Formally, ¼(!1) = ¼(!2) = ¼(!3) = 1
3, and
u1(¢;x1) = x1; F1 = ff!1;!2g;f!3gg;
u2(¢;x2) =
p
x2; F2 = ff!1;!2g;f!3gg;
u3(¢;x3) = x3; F3 = ff!1g;f!2g;f!3gg:
The unique constrained market equilibrium allocation is (300;500;400) in state
!1; (700;500;600) in state !2 and (c=3;c=3;c=3) is state !3. Even if this allocation is
interim e±cient, it is not interim envy free, since the third guy envies the bundle of
the ¯rst agent in state !2, i.e., u3(!2;x1(!2)) = 700 > 600 = u3(!2;x3(!2)): Notice
that condition (¤) is satis¯ed, and according to Theorem 0.1 the set of fair alloca-
tions is not empty. Indeed, the unique fair allocation shares equally the aggregate
endowment, i.e., (400;400;400) in !1; (600;600;600) in !2 and (c=3;c=3;c=3) in !3.
This means that although there exists an interim fair allocation, the unique
constrained market equilibrium, which is what really agents consume, is not fair.
This example reinforces the idea that in di®erential information economies fair-
ness is an utopia, and since everyone could agree that all economic activities or all
contracts among individuals are made under uncertainty or incomplete information,
it seems that we are condemned to live in an unfair society.
2.3 The \Maximin" case
In this section we address the following questions: are really asymmetrically in-
formed agents envious? Is there anything we can do to change such an unfair
situation? In what do we make mistake?
We show that the solution consists in changing our attitude towards uncertainty.
If we abandon the Bayesian subjective expected utility (SEU) formulation and re-
place it by the maximin expected utility (MEU), not only a fair distribution of
resources among asymmetrically informed agents always exists, but also the related
notion of competitive equilibrium is fair. In other words, we consider a di®erential
information economy in which agents' preferences are represented by the maximin
utility (see 2) and we propose a new notion of equilibrium which solves the con°ict
between e±ciency and envy freeness when the equity of allocations is evaluated in
5an interim stage. Below we introduce the notion of maximin fairness.
A feasible allocation y maximin Pareto dominates an allocation x if every agent
prefers (with MEU formulation) y over x in each state, i.e., ui(!;yi) > ui(!;xi) for
each i 2 I and each ! 2 ­. A feasible allocation x is said to be maximin e±cient
if it is not maximin Pareto dominated by any other allocation. Let x be a feasible
allocation and let ! be a state of nature. Then, agent i maximin envies j at !, if
ui(!;xj) > ui(!;xi): The allocation x is said to be maximin envy-free if there
does not exist a state ! at which some agent i maximin envies some agent j. A
feasible allocation x is maximin fair if it is both maximin e±cient and maximin
envy-free.
In order to prove the existence of a maximin fair allocation, the following notion
of equilibrium is needed (see [3]).
A pair (p;x), where p : ­ ! I R`
+ is a non-zero function and x is a feasible
allocation is said to be a maximin competitive equilibrium (MCE) if for each
agent i 2 I and state ! 2 ­, xi maximizes ui(!;¢) subject to p(!0) ¢ yi(!0) ·
p(!0) ¢ ei(!0) for all !0 2 Fi(!). A feasible allocation x is said to be a maximin
competitive equilibrium allocation if there exists a price vector p : ­ ! I R`
+
such that (p;x) is a maximin competitive equilibrium. It has been proved in [3]
that a maximin competitive equilibrium exists. We now show that any maximin
competitive equilibrium allocation is fair and hence we deduce the existence of a
maximin fair allocation.
Proposition 2.3 If (¤) holds, any maximin competitive equilibrium allocation is
maximin Pareto optimal.
Proof: Let (p;x) be a maximin competitive equilibrium and assume, on the con-
trary, that there exists a feasible allocation y such that ui(!;yi) > ui(!;xi) for all
i 2 I and ! 2 ­. In particular, the above inequality holds in the state ¹ ! of con-
dition (¤). This implies that p(¹ !) ¢ yi(¹ !) > p(¹ !) ¢ ei(¹ !) for all i 2 I; and hence
p(¹ !) ¢
P
i2i yi(¹ !) > p(¹ !) ¢
P
i2I ei(¹ !); which clearly contradicts the feasibility of y.
¤
We show below that any maximin competitive equilibrium with equal income is
also maximin envy free, and hence maximin fair.
Proposition 2.4 If (¤) holds, any maximin competitive equilibrium allocation with
equal income is maximin fair. The converse may not be true.
6Proof: Let (p;x) be a maximin competitive equilibrium with equal income and
assume on the contrary that x is not maximin fair. Since any maximin com-
petitive equilibrium allocation is maximin e±cient (see Proposition 0.3), x is not
maximin envy free. Therefore, there exist two agents i and j and a state ! such
that ui(!;xj) > ui(!;xi). This implies that xj = 2 fyi : p(!0) ¢ yi(!0) · p(!0) ¢
ei(!0) for all !0 2 Fi(!)g, that is, there exists !0 2 Fi(!) such that p(!0) ¢ xj(!0) >
p(!0) ¢ ei(!0) = p(!0) ¢ ej(!0); which is a contradiction.
Hence, the set of equal income maximin competitive equilibrium allocations is con-
tained in the set of maximin fair allocations. Actually, this inclusion is strict. In-
deed, consider the economy described in Example 0.2, and notice that the unique
maximin competitive equilibrium allocation, which assigns (400;400;400) in state
a; (600;600;600) in state b and (c=3;c=3;c=3) in state c, is maximin fair. On the
other hand the allocation which assigns (400;400;400) in state a, (400;400;1000) in
state b and (c=3;c=3;c=3) in state c is maximin fair, but it is clearly not a maximin
competitive equilibrium allocation. ¤
Since, under standard assumptions, a maximin competitive equilibrium exists
(see [3]), the above Proposition also guarantees that the set of maximin fair alloca-
tions is non empty.
3 Conclusions and open questions
We have provided a condition which guarantees the existence of a (Bayesian) fair
allocation and shown that this is not enough to have equity in the society, since the
constrained market equilibrium, which is what really agents consume, may not be
fair. On the other hand, we have observed that in a di®erential information economy,
in which agents preferences are given by maximin utility, not only a maximin fair
allocation exists, but more important the maximin competitive equilibrium is fair.
However, equal income maximin competitive equilibrium are not the only e±cient
and equitable allocations. This suggests us that in order to get a characterization
of equilibria in terms of fairness, coalitional notions of fairness are needed. We have
already proved such an equivalence in [5] and [8] with two di®erent approaches. In
the above papers, we consider only Bayesian expected utility. I guess that the same
holds true with maximin formulation and a continuum of agents.
Another interesting point is the following: we have assumed that ex post the
realized state of nature is commonly known. This makes irrelevant incentive and
7measurability constraints. What does it happen if ex post each agent can only verify
that the realized state of nature belongs to a certain event of his private partition?
Typically, we require allocations to be Fi-measurable. Does this measurability as-
sumption create any problems? Since agents are asymmetrically informed, can agent
i compare his allocation xi with j's allocation xj, which may not be Fi-measurable?
Therefore, what is the correct de¯nition of fair allocation in this context? We address
all these questions in [1].
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